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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 890601-CA 
v. : 
JOHN QUAS, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON REHEARING AND 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Did this Court properly apply the standard governing 
refiling a criminal charge, as articulated in State v. Brickev, 
714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986)? 
Does this Court's analysis of the "plain error" 
doctrine require clarification? 
Should footnote 5 be deleted? 
A petition for rehearing is justified when the 
appellate court has overlooked or misapprehended points of law or 
fact. Utah R. App. P. 35(a); Cummings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 
172-73, 129 P.2d 619, 624 (1913). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
No constitutional provisions, statutes or rules are 
directly applicable to the resolution of defendant's petition for 
rehearing. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with murder in the second degree, 
a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 
(Supp. 1989) (R. 3). That charge was dismissed at the 
preliminary hearing, the court determining that there was 
insufficient evidence to bind defendant over to stand trial. The 
State refiled the charge, and, after a second preliminary 
hearing, defendant was bound over for trial. 
Defendant was convicted of second degree murder after a 
jury trial (R. 589). Defendant was sentenced to serve a term of 
five years to life at the Utah State Prison with an additional 
term of one to five years for use of a firearm, to be served 
consecutively with the other term (R. 600-01). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Facts pertinent to defendant's petition are included in 
this Court's ruling, State v. Ouas, 163 Utah Adv. Rep. 46 (Utah 
Ct. App. June 18, 1991). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court's analysis under Brickev is sound and need 
not be altered. Application of the "other good cause" portion of 
the Brickev standard, which encompasses a prosecutor's innocent 
miscalculation of the quantum of evidence needed to sustain a 
determination of probable cause, is as appropriate in the context 
of a dismissal of charges as in a continuance of the preliminary 
hearing. 
The "plain error" analysis entered by this Court was 
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proper. However, the sentence cited by defendant as confusing 
properly could be deleted. 
The State agrees with defendant's objection to this 
Court's reliance on the docketing statement to preserve an issue 
for appeal. However, the remaining portion of the footnote is 
proper and should not be deleted. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT'S ANALYSIS UNDER STATE V. BRICKEY IS 
PROPER AND SHOULD NOT BE ALTERED. 
In his petition for rehearing, defendant acknowledges 
the standard for refiling a criminal charge, articulated in State 
v. Brickev, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), and accepted by this Court 
in the instant case. That standard provides for refiling with Ma 
showing of new or additional evidence or other good cause." 
Brickev, 714 P.2d at 645; Ouas, 163 Utah Adv. Rep. at 47. 
However, he asks this Court to eliminate its analysis under the 
"good cause" prong of Brickev, arguing, in part, that this Court 
has equated "good cause" with prosecutorial "good faith." (Pet. 
of Appellant at 2). However, this Court did not equate the two, 
but stated that "good cause may include cases where a prosecutor 
miscalculated the quantum of evidence needed to bind over and the 
ensuing further investigation was not performed to procrastinate, 
harass, or shop for a more favorable magistrate." Ouas, 163 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 47 (citing Brickev, 714 P.2d at 647). That 
statement is wholly consistent with Brickev and should remain. 
Defendant acknowledges that Brickev does not 
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distinguish between a continuance and refiling. (Pet, of 
Appellant at 2). However, he also argues that "[i]f the 
prosecutor miscalculates the quantum of evidence necessary to 
sustain a finding of probable cause, the magistrate should allow 
a reasonable continuance for the collection of evidence that is 
reasonably available, and which continuance would not cause undue 
delay." (Pet. of Appellant at 3-4). In making that argument, 
defendant does not explain how a prosecutor can determine, prior 
to the magistrate's ruling, whether or not the charges are going 
to be dismissed, how a prosecutor has the authority to "allow a 
case to be dismissed" or why a continuance is preferable to 
refiling, since they are governed by the same standard. His 
argument should be rejected. 
Defendant further argues that this Court accepted, 
without scrutiny, the magistrate's finding of "new or previously 
unavailable" evidence at the second preliminary hearing on the 
basis that defendant did not marshal the evidence. That argument 
ignores this Court's analysis. This Court properly exercised its 
appellate function, stating that it would not overturn the trial 
court's findings absent clear error, found that defendant had not 
borne its burden of marshaling the evidence in attacking the 
trial court's determination, and accepted the trial court's 
findings. Ouas, 163 Utah Adv. Rep. at 48. 
Defendant asserts that he did marshal the evidence, by 
noting the "only" evidence that he believes satisfies the Brickev 
standard. (Pet. of Appellant at 6). He does not have the option 
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to include only the evidence favorable to his theory of the case. 
In so marshaling, he does admit some confusion about what 
"marshalling the evidence" requires- Id. at 6-7. As this Court 
stated in the instant case, "the appellant 'must marshal all of 
the evidence in support of the trial court's findings of fact and 
then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the 
findings against an attack.'" Ouas, 163 Utah Adv. Rep. at 47 
(quoting State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990)). 
Thus, marshaling the evidence is a two part process. First, a 
defendant must state all of the evidence that supports the trial 
court's ruling. In the instant case, pertinent evidence would 
include the twelve new exhibits and five new witnesses. Second, 
once defendant has marshaled all the evidence, he or she must 
demonstrate that the evidence, including reasonable inferences 
that can be drawn from that evidence, is insufficient to support 
the trial court's findings. In the instant case, defendant has 
done neither. 
Defendant has failed to demonstrate that this Court 
overlooked or misapprehended either fact or law in its Brickev 
analysis, and his arguments should be rejected. 
POINT II 
THE COURT'S ANALYSIS OF THE ADMISSION OF 
CERTAIN EVIDENCE UNDER THE PLAIN ERROR 
DOCTRINE IS CORRECT, AND THE SENTENCE 
DEFENDANT OBJECTS TO COULD BE DELETED AS 
SUPERFLUOUS. 
Defendant argues that the following sentence mixes the 
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two prongs of the "plain error" test1: 
Third, even if the remark were prejudicial, 
it was not sufficiently obvious to invoke the 
plain error exception, especially in light of 
the corroborating evidence offered by this 
and other witnesses. 
Quas, 163 Utah Adv. Rep. at 49. The State agrees with defendant 
that the final phrase of the sentence goes to the issue of 
prejudice, not to the question of obviousness. 
To clarify the statement, defendant requests that this 
Court specify which corroborating evidence it relied on in 
reaching its conclusion. However, this Court found no obvious 
error in Dr. Grey's testimony. Therefore, the prejudice prong of 
the plain error test need not be reached. Accordingly, the 
sentence defendant objects to is superfluous and could be 
deleted. 
POINT III 
FOOTNOTE 5 SHOULD BE MODIFIED BY DELETING THE 
PORTION CONCERNING THE DOCKETING STATEMENT. 
The State agrees with defendant that footnote 5 could 
be modified. Specifically, the State agrees that issues not 
raised in the docketing statement should not be deemed waived on 
appeal. The purpose of the docketing statement is not to outline 
every conceivable issue that the court might choose or decline to 
1
 In State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 35, cert, denied, 110 
S.Ct. 62 (1989), the Utah Supreme Court established a two-part 
test to determine plain error. First, the error must be "plain," 
that is, from examination of the record it should be obvious that 
the court was committing error. Second, the error must have 
affected the substantial rights of the defendant, that is, the 
error must have been harmful. See Utah R. Evid. 103(d). 
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address. Utah R. App. P. 9(b) ("The docketing statement is not a 
brief and should not contain arguments or procedural motions.••). 
Cf. Nunlev v. Stan Katz Real Estate, 388 P.2d 798, 800 (Utah 
1964) ("[T]he object of a notice of appeal is to advise the 
opposite party that an appeal has been taken from a specific 
judgment in a particular case."). Therefore, the State does not 
object to the deletion of the portion of the footnote that 
discusses the docketing statement. 
However, the Court's reliance on State v. Humphrey, 794 
P.2d 496 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), cert, granted, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 
1990), to resolve the issue of the appellate jurisdiction of the 
district court is appropriate. That case is dispositive of the 
jurisdiction issue, and that portion of the footnote should not 
be changed. The footnote, therefore, could be modified, as 
follows: 
In his brief, appellant asks us to consider 
issues surrounding the court's interlocutory 
order to bind him over for trial, including 
whether the district court had jurisdiction 
to review the circuit court's decision to 
bind over. We have already disposed of the 
jurisdictional issue in State v. Humphrey, 
794 P.2d 496, 497 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 
150 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (1990). 
Thus modified, it could be moved from the Court's discussion of 
expert testimony and placed following the sentence, "The trial 
court granted the State's motion on the ground that it lacked 
jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of evidence presented at 
the preliminary hearing." 163 Utah Adv. Rep. at 47. These 
modifications both address defendant's concerns about the proper 
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role of a docketing statement and reflect this Court's proper 
reliance on Humphrey. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should amend its 
opinion and deny defendant's petition for rehearing. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ day of August, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DITH S.H. ATHERTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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